BY JENNIFER RUTH
Last week on Academe Blog, John Wilson argued that one idea proposed by Princeton faculty members who wrote a July 4 letter calling for anti-racist reforms is misguided. The signatories ask Princeton administrators to “constitute a committee composed entirely of faculty that would oversee the investigation and discipline of racist behaviors, incidents, research, and publication on the part of faculty, following a protocol for grievance and appeal to be spelled out in Rules and Procedures of the Faculty. Guidelines on what counts as racist behavior, incidents, research, and publication will be authored by a faculty committee for incorporation into the same set of rules and procedures.” I do not know the particular controversies at Princeton that may have prompted parts of the letter or that, in turn, have sparked in reaction to it. I consider here only the idea of constituting a faculty committee.
Wilson’s concern is understandable. The default position of many of us, I’d guess, is that punishing faculty speech is almost always a mistake and that rigorous protections for speech have in the past enabled progress significantly more often than they have hindered it. Here’s the thing, though: faculty are already routinely punished for speech perceived to be discriminatory. Human resource departments, offices of equity and inclusion, and other bureaucracies of the university pursue these investigations, and with steadily increasing frequency and severity of consequence over the last decade. When faculty and staff are investigated for discrimination at Portland State University (PSU), where I teach, the Office of Global Diversity and Inclusion (OGDI) relays its findings to administrators and recommends discipline if it believes discrimination has occurred. It is then up to the administrator (chair, dean, provost, or president) to decide on disciplinary sanctions, which can range from an oral reprimand to termination. All of this happens without faculty involvement or oversight, unless a faculty member or administrative professional who is subject to any consequences more severe than a written reprimand requests a panel of peers to weigh in before discipline is imposed. The requirement for such an option is the result of the strong collective bargaining agreement negotiated by our wonderfully proactive PSU-AAUP chapter. The committee proposed by the Princeton letter would make this the process—not something that might kick in as a last resort after a faculty member has already been under what is usually an extremely protracted investigation.
One response to Wilson’s post came from someone who was punished in one of these kinds of investigations and who sees the merits of a faculty committee. “At least,” Frank P. Tomasulo wrote, “there would be a ‘rule book’ by which professors would know what was verboten and what was acceptable. In theory, such a list of ‘deplorable’ acts might also be able to spell out the penalties for violating the ‘laws’ and might make distinctions between egregious behavior and an inadvertent MICRO-aggression.” Not only might there be some clarity under a model in which a faculty committee was under an obligation to offer clearer guidelines than any that faculty currently receive but it would not be lawyers or HR personnel alone judging events that unfolded in places few of them ever inhabit, like classrooms. Faculty are better positioned to understand the nuances and complexities involved in teaching diverse populations in a rapidly changing social landscape with rapidly changing cultural norms.
As it stands now, faculty are punished behind the scenes in ways that the rest of us might or might not agree with but will never know about. It’s bad enough that our current reality is one that subjects our community members to a largely invisible and intimidatingly mysterious process but here’s what’s perhaps worse: we are still forced to live in perpetuity with that faculty member whose discriminatory actions are not unintentional—the rare faculty member who is a white supremacist or not above playing to a dangerous alt-right emboldened by a race-baiting president. This person—who may sound like a bogeyman to those whose campuses are happily free of such people but will be readily recognizable to those whose campuses aren’t— is never disciplined or, if he is, he is disciplined with dramatically less severe consequences than are others. This is because he implicitly or explicitly threatens lawsuits, engages right-wing organizations with deep pockets to back him, or weaponizes academic freedom as a shield. Diversity officers might want to see these actors disciplined but they are overridden by university administrators who consider the risks of public warfare too great. In these cases, a faculty committee could pressure the university to uphold its values more powerfully than can the diversity officer.
There are many other relevant angles to this discussion: the democracy-destabilizing nature of social media in 2020 in which “more speech” is increasingly understood to be an insufficient response to the platforming of hate speech, the institutional and economic power asymmetries that amplify some positions and drown out others, the national reckoning with historical inequities and abuses that appears to be moving mainstream opinion regarding what is considered reasonable, wrong, or unjust. One last thing is worth mentioning because it will be critical to any discussion of such a committee: academic freedom. In “What is Academic? What is Freedom?”, one of the original Princeton signatories, Andrew Cole, writes: “In free speech, you can say most anything. In academic freedom, you can’t. It’s not anything goes, and it’s baffling that so many conflate ‘free speech’ with ‘academic freedom’ — because the University itself certainly doesn’t.” Wilson does all but conflate “free speech and academic freedom” in his response to Cole’s essay, calling the two “close cousins.” I see it differently. Free speech is what our First Amendment rights guarantee. Academic freedom is what we earn through a process that involves our departmental, university, and disciplinary colleagues. With free speech, we have the freedom to be grossly wrong or grossly unjust. With academic freedom, we do not. We are subject to the review of our peers.
Ending on “academic freedom” is unsatisfying because a thousand questions naturally follow from what I wrote above, such as: If academic freedom is largely procedural (determined through processes like evaluation for tenure, say), what about the academic freedom of the adjunct faculty member who has not been through these authority-making processes? What about a full professor who is essentially now freed from the evaluation of his peers and who takes a disturbing, possibly demonstrably discriminatory, turn in his work? How do we think about extramural speech in relation to academic freedom when social media is used as an extension of a professor’s work rather than as a kind of citizen-hobby?
The Princeton letter writers do not grapple with these questions but rather with how to build an anti-racist university—something we all need to be grappling with—and they make some sound proposals, including the one Wilson considers a “terrible idea.” A faculty oversight committee for discrimination is an idea that deserves thorough and thoughtful exploration. In mulling over its merits, we might clarify for ourselves other murky and increasingly contentious issues that influence how we define and, thus, protect academic freedom.
Guest blogger Jennifer Ruth is professor of film studies at Portland State University. She is a member of the AAUP’s Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure and served for two years as the faculty editor for the Journal of Academic Freedom.
My new book Reasoning, Argumentation, and Deliberative Democracy includes substantial discussion of academic freedom as the intellectual freedom to do academic work, which is both more and less than freedom of speech. Here are some key paragraphs, focusing on research:
“It should be clear from this discussion that academic freedom is not just free speech for all. Neither classrooms nor scholarly journals are simply forums for freedom of expression. This is not to say that intellectual freedom is less important in academic contexts than in contexts of democratic deliberation. On the contrary, intellectual freedom is at least as crucial in academic contexts as in any other. But academic work requires a subtler conception of intellectual freedom that recognizes the aims of teaching, learning, and inquiry, and the crucial role of expertise (Post, 2012). . . .
“There is no academic reason, however, for discrimination on the basis of viewpoint. . . . Viewpoint neutrality is crucial to intellectual freedom generally (Moshman, 2020) and to associated legal standards such as the First Amendment (Strossen, 2018). A standard of viewpoint neutrality shows respect for persons and reasons and furthers the promotion of rationality agency.
“The standard of viewpoint neutrality applies equally with respect to research and publication. Respect for intellectual freedom is crucial to the academic integrity of a scholarly journal and of the field it represents, but no academic publication is a forum for free speech. Journals are limited to particular areas of study and only publish work that meets academic standards as determined by expert peer reviewers. Decisions about what to publish are not content neutral; they are based on the content of the submitted manuscript. Nevertheless, the process may be deemed a system of selection, rather than a regime of censorship, provided the selection process is viewpoint neutral. Ideally, manuscripts are rejected if they fail to justify their conclusions, regardless of viewpoint, and accepted for publication if they are found to meet academic standards, regardless of viewpoint. Authors may be required to justify conclusions reached in the manuscript and remove conclusions they cannot justify, but they should not be expected to remove viewpoints simply because reviewers deem those viewpoints false or offensive. Content discrimination is inherent in the process, but viewpoint discrimination would undermine the academic integrity of the journal.”
Thus, even if a viewpoint is deemed racist, discrimination on the basis of viewpoint violates academic freedom. Universities should not undermine the research and publication process with viewpoint-based punishment of researchers.
This is very coherently, if elegantly stated. Congratulations: It should serve as a role model and “official statement” for the Academy. It may not be surprising that it comes from the open Great Plains of UNebraska Lincoln–at least in my profession, generally regarded as one of capable, mature intellectual culture. I look forward to reading the new book, from Routledge.
Thanks, Matt. Information about the book can be found here:
https://www.routledge.com/Reasoning-Argumentation-and-Deliberative-Democracy/Moshman/p/book/9780367312770
The section of the book on academic freedom as the intellectual freedom to do academic work is adapted from an article I wrote for the 2017 AAUP Journal of Academic Freedom, which can be found here:
https://www.aaup.org/JAF8/academic-freedom-freedom-do-academic-work#.Wcqm7I6QzuR
The writer makes a very interesting point concerning the distinction between free speech and academic freedom. I discussed this on a public television program in Chicago (WTTW), with FIRE’s Ari Cohen in 2016. It appears to be a problem also for students who are equally entitled to “academic freedom” but can be intimidated by threats of sanction (the so-called “Chicago Principles”).
May I otherwise offer two observations, and otherwise internally, from the limited experience as a lecturer. One, it seems that these contentions are limited strictly to political speech and political academic freedom. I don’t see an uproar over an astrophysics professor questioning the orbit of an exoplanet; a chemical engineering professor taking issue with the performance of nanoparticulate polymer coatings; a philosophy professor challenging Hegelian anti-realism; or even an economist questioning competitive equilibrium (although that’s getting very close to the edge of acceptability, if not blasphemy).
Two, I don’t see the senior “tenured” class getting embroiled in controversy, very often. They tend to keep their heads down, and only when at “emeritus” status does one occasionally see suddenly a brave soul come out with a tell-all book or a public criticism (like Harvard’s Harvey Mansfield who said it was “safe” to speak out now because he was retiring). All the drama seems to be with the poor adjuncts, graduate students, assistant professors and an occasional associate; but even there, if they are on “tenure track” they tend to toe the line among their group culture. Department consensus seems very important and generally pervasive.
Moreover, there are only really two classes of “free speech” in the academy that will get you in the hot seat: criticizing Israel, or supporting BDS (actually a codified punishment), and objecting to any identitarian agenda that can be a cause, or even an implied or simply asserted cause, in Title VI. Of course, if you walk around with a red hat on (which is perfectly OK if it’s of Marx), you are off the tenure track–literally, and blacklisted. Tenure seems more often a political club, not an academic or scholarship one (all perhaps moot at this point as the higher education complex seems to be imploding).
The writer also invokes the fascinating question as to why constitutional free speech rights do not apply universally on all campuses. The famous 1960’s cases of Dixon and Dickey v. Alabama, which ratified constitutional rights on public campuses, may need some serious refreshing.
Otherwise, the writer had my attention, until she derailed into a partisan indulgence: viz, “… but here’s what’s perhaps worse: we are still forced to live in perpetuity with that faculty member whose discriminatory actions are not unintentional—the rare faculty member who is a white supremacist or not above playing to a dangerous alt-right emboldened by a race-baiting president.”
It seems the film studies professor is actually in very safe academic territory culturally, but sadly undermines her entire credibility with such thoughts (especially among college parents). As for film, may I suggest a psychological remedy: the 1949 epic ‘Twelve O’Clock High’ with Gregory Peck: One of the finest lessons on leadership, used in hundreds of companies, at West Point, and at many business, and even a rare law, school. Moreover, the academy award for best supporting actor went to Dean Jagger, who famously said in one of the film’s finest moments, “I was thinking, which is something a man should not do.”
Regards, ’96, The University of Chicago; ’84, The University of Texas at Austin
May “the film studies professor” suggest a few films that might be of educational value to you, Matt Andersson? Send me an email at ruthj@pdx.edu and I’ll reply with a few.
Your claim that there are “really only two classes of ‘free speech’ in the academy that will get you in the hot seat” has nothing to do with the realities that I and many people of color have experienced. I was condemned by Fox News and Turning Point, after which my university’s administrators censored my course syllabus–over a word used innocently, consistent with the dictionary’s definition. Every person I know who’s been attacked in the name of “free speech” has been a woman or person of color attacked by conservative/racist/misogynistic administrators. The world you inhabit is vastly different from the world many others of us inhabit.
Thanks for adding this, John. I read your essay in JAF Volume 10 as I was preparing to write this!
Sir, with all due respect, suggesting white students defer to students of color is neither more rational nor more ethical than suggesting that students of color defer to white students. Shouldn’t ‘anti-racist’ reforms definitionally preclude such assertions as you made in your syllabus? To the extent the academy measures success and apportions advancement based on identity over intellect — on the irrelevant skin pigmentation of the speaker, rather than on the quality and validity of the research and argument presented — it will be correspondingly committing suicide.
It’s true that the bad proposal at Princeton has a good process: Faculty should be in charge of punishing faculty. However, the Princeton plan doesn’t replace the bad system where faculty are punished behind the scenes; it simply adds on another opportunity to punish faculty, now for their research.
I think Ruth is wrong to say that academic freedom does not protect the freedom to be grossly wrong. Extramural utterances are a core part of academic freedom, and clearly the right of professors to be wrong is protected under it. Research is a trickier measure, since faculty can be evaluated for “wrong” research, and they can be punished for research misconduct, but they cannot be punished for having views deemed to be “wrong” (such as “racist”).
Discrimination needs a victim; someone must have been harmed by a professor’s harassment or discriminatory actions. But with racist research, there is not necessarily a victim. If we punish research deemed objectionable for its content as a form of discrimination, a college is vastly enhancing the apparatus of punishment, expanding it from discriminatory actions that harm specific persons to mere opinions deemed racist.
As I mentioned in response to your post, I think there are some unsettled questions that deserve to be worked through regarding the differences between academic freedom and free speech (and, then, how to think about extramural speech in relationship to those).
Nobody, not me or the Princeton letter writers, argued that people should be punished for “mere opinion.” A committee would establish some guidelines for how to distinguish racist research/teaching/speech from mere opinion. Such guidelines might need to redefine what is considered damaging to others (the “victim”) in light of decades’ worth of research about the harmful effects of racism.
Readers may enjoy an opinion in today’s Wall Street Journal that takes issue with the assertion that “Research is a trickier measure, since faculty can be evaluated for “wrong” research, and they can be punished for research misconduct, but they cannot be punished for having views deemed to be “wrong” (such as “racist”).
It seems research is precisely subject to conformity with, if not active promotion of, identitarian hysteria or dogma, even (or now especially) in the sciences. It seems history does repeat itself, and it is Berlin, 1939, all over again.
According to the WSJ writer, (not surprisingly an Emeritus) Professor Igor Mel’čuk, of the University of Montreal, it is the new Great Terror: https://www.wsj.com/articles/science-turns-political-like-everything-else-11595269520, and archived here: https://archive.is/N0pje. There are several other excellent if alarming letters, all from academics.
Here is a sample:
–“Academic promotion, publications and successful grant applications often hinge on nonscientific factors including gender, race, personal networks and liberal political ideology.”
–“Catastrophes…await American science and culture if Americans remain indifferent to the assaults on the principles of researchers’ advancement in conformity with their merits rather than with an ideology aimed at promoting minorities. I spent half of my life in the ex-U.S.S.R., as a researcher at the Academy of Sciences. I lived through the Great Terror, and my experience allows me to see the inevitable consequences of today’s onslaught on the institutions of the American republic: its irreparable destruction.”
–“Let’s hope Lawrence Krauss has something like tenure at the foundation where he’s employed. If, as his evidence suggests, the hard sciences—nominally committed to the truths disclosed by the rigorous methods of science—are now dominated by men and women whose primary motive in their work is the appeasement of the powerful advocates of racist ideology, then the poison of totalitarianism has truly penetrated the very core of a once-free society.”
–“Academic structures, most notably tenure, frequently continue to offer sweeping protections to those in power.”
Putting aside the thin understanding of academic freedom here, Prof. Ruth’s hope that reviewing faculty adherence to “Anti-Racism” via an all-faculty committee would have the benefit of offering “clearer guidelines” to expectations under the new orthodoxy seems quite unrealistic. First, since many of the ideas underlying Anti-Racism are incoherent and unstable, I suspect it might be impossible to describe how to comply with them. E.g., these speech codes and taboos apply differently to different “standpoints,” which are derived from intersectional “identities,” which themselves evolve as self-professed identities are recognized or criticized by ever-shifting political coalitions among the activists. So which professorial “identities” can assign which readings with “problematic” content this semester? (Perhaps faculty would soon be encouraged to go through a pre-clearance of their syllabi, for safety’s sake.) Second, any such moral code, in its attempt to define and enforce *justice*, will doubtless use such broad language that no sin will be allowed to pass without due punishment merely because the rule books didn’t quite apply to latest case. After all, since “silence is violence,” even failing to use and endorse goodthink may soon be understood to be thoughtcrime. And finally, once the professors have conceded that they *should* be judged when accused of “unjust” thoughts, how long will such a Committee of Public Safety be permitted to remain entirely staffed with faculty, while the “victimized” students have no “representation”? At a guess, only for so long as the verdicts please the activists.