In Defense of the Emory Law Journal

BY JOHN K. WILSON

This week, there was what Jonathan Turley called a “major controversy brewing over free speech and censorship at Emory Law Journal.” Robert George argued, “It’s hard to think of a stupider, more self-defeating idea than imposing political litmus tests on articles submitted to major law reviews. But that’s what the Emory Law Journal has done, rejecting on ideological grounds an essay by the brilliant legal scholar Lawrence Alexander.”

George is wrong on every count. The Emory Law Journal did not reject Alexander’s essay. They did not declare any ideological grounds and in fact expressly stated that they would happily publish views that most of the editors disagreed with. There is no political litmus test that the Emory Law Journal has ever stated or hinted at. 

Here’s what really happened: Larry Alexander submitted an embarrassingly bad article partly copied from one of his rants on a blog, and when the editors asked him to edit it and provide citations for some of his dumbest arguments, he refused to make any changes and instead tried to present himself as a victim of censorship.

Gail Heriot wrote in defense of Alexander at Instapundit: 

Editor-in-Chief Danielle Kerker sent an ultimatum to Larry: Either “greatly revise” the essay or the ELJ will have to “withdraw[] our publication offer.” Larry understood how destructive to academic values it would be to cower under such pressure. He declined to revise the article.

No, revising an article is not destructive to academic values; it is the essence of academic values. This is standard operating procedure for any publication: If you refuse to make any changes, the editors can refuse to publish it.

Here were the changes Emory Law Journal editor-in-chief Danielle Kerker asked for in an email to Alexander:

I shared the piece with my Executive Board, and they unanimously stated they do not feel comfortable publishing this piece as written. We think there are fair points of intellectual disagreement that would not necessarily warrant the extreme action of withdrawing our publication offer. However, we believe this piece would need to be greatly revised to be published in our journal.

We take issue with your conversation on systemic racism, finding your words hurtful and unnecessarily divisive. Additionally, there are various instances of insensitive language use throughout the essay (e.g., widespread use of the objectifying term “blacks” and “the blacks” (pages 2, 3, 6, 8, etc.); the discussions on criminality and heredity (pages 11 and 14), the uncited statement that thankfully racism is not an issue today (page 18)).  And, crucially, the discussion on racism is not strongly connected to your commentary on Professor Perry’s work, which is the focus of the Issue and the purpose behind the publication opportunity offered.

Can you please modify the piece, removing Part III and focusing on building Parts I & II to discuss the merits of Professor Perry’s work, by Sunday, December 19? We would welcome a manuscript revised along the lines we have suggested, but, absent those revisions, ELJ will not publish this contribution to the festschrift.

The use of terms such as “insensitive,” “hurtful,” and “divisive” attracted angry attacks from conservatives. Personally, I don’t think “hurtful” or “divisive” is a good argument against scholarly work, and I wish the editors had focused exclusively on the essay’s intellectual flaws. But I suspect the editors were just trying to be polite by suggesting that Alexander was unintentionally offensive. We don’t know exactly what the editor was talking about, but if I had to guess it would be the section where Alexander argues that Disparate Racial Impact theory is “more in line with regimes such as Nazi Germany than with the literal ethos to which most Americans adhere.” (I think Alexander meant “liberal” and not “literal,” but I don’t want to censor him by doing any editing.) Comparing scholars concerned about racial disparities to Nazis is not merely “hurtful” and “divisive.” It’s also intellectually lazy, idiotic, and morally repugnant. I don’t think that requesting an author to edit out dumb and offensive Nazi comparisons is a form of censorship. I think it’s good editing.

Perhaps the editors should have realized that some conservatives are very sensitive and need safe spaces free from words like “harmful” and “divisive” that might trigger their ideological outrage. But I have a hard time objecting to any of their editing critiques or presuming that political bias is the only possible reason why editors might want to change an essay this badly argued.

Even the harshest critics of the Emory Law Journal editors admit in their arguments that changes in Alexander’s essay were warranted. According to Gail Heriot, “As for ‘the blacks,’ I have been told that some consider this to be a rude way to refer collectively to the members of a race. But, even assuming that it would be rude, Larry wasn’t using the term that way. He was using it to refer to the particular blacks in one of his hypotheticals. The ‘the’ was intended to make that clear.”

That might be true of one reference, but not for this one: “Perhaps the weakest part of Michael’s case for DRI theory is his account of the etiology of the handicaps he attributes to the blacks.” Alexander is definitely not writing about “the” particular blacks in some hypothetical. So by Heriot’s own reasoning, Alexander was referring to black people in a way that’s considered rude and that it would be reasonable for editors to want to change.

Alexander’s essay is a compendium of bizarre and unsupported claims. Alexander tries to minimize the harms of slavery by pointing out that “in the absence of slavery, today’s individual blacks would not exist.” He explains this further: 

For each of us is the product of a particular sperm and egg. Change the circumstances of conception ever so slightly, and a different individual is created. And slavery caused more than slight changes in the circumstances of conception that would have existed in its absence. Each of us in reality owes our very existence to past horrendous events, and that is as true of today’s blacks as it is of the rest of us. So, none today can say, but for slavery, I would have been better off. People might be better off today had there been no slavery, but none of us, blacks included, would be.

Yes, he’s actually arguing that we must oppose reparations for slavery because without slavery we would all be different people with different parents. It’s an argument as novel as it is idiotic.

Alexander also argued: “Racism is not the cause of black poverty to the extent it exists. (If it were, African and West Indian blacks would not be doing as well as they are, or emigrating to the U.S. in great numbers.) Although racism could be a problem for blacks today, the reality is, thankfully, is that it isn’t.” I have a hard time taking someone seriously who thinks that immigration to America by black people from Africa is proof that racism is not a problem. (By that logic, there has never been any bigotry in any country that has any immigrants.)

Alexander’s essay is full of strange sentences, like this: “Government cannot magically put dissolved black families back together, or instill love of education and an aversion to criminality in black children.”

Alexander also wrote: “The real impediment to the advancement of poor blacks—and everyone knows this, regardless of whether they admit it—is the cultural factors that have produced family disintegration.” When your standard for evidence is “everyone knows this,” it shows a distinct lack of scholarly rigor. So I have a hard time understanding why anyone would condemn the Emory Law Journal editors for merely asking for citations for his claims that racism doesn’t exist. 

Turley writes, “Emory editors objected to Alexander saying that racism is not a problem today. As noted, I disagree with this view.  However, I am not sure how the editors expect him to add citation to his own viewpoint. Would they demand a citation from an academic who wrote ‘Racism is a problem today’?”

It is absolutely bizarre that Turley thinks legal scholars shouldn’t have to cite evidence for the “viewpoint” that racism doesn’t exist. Of course statements that “racism is a problem today” should have evidence to support it, too. It’s understandable that an editor might be more likely to ask for a citation for a counterintuitive claim than for one that’s almost universally accepted. But Turley is accusing the editors of hypocrisy without any evidence that they would impose a different standard on authors they agree with. It is not anything resembling censorship to merely ask an author for a citation when they claim racism doesn’t exist.

The final objection of the Emory Law Journal editors was their biggest concern: “crucially, the discussion on racism is not strongly connected to your commentary on Professor Perry’s work, which is the focus of the Issue and the purpose behind the publication opportunity offered.” Obviously, a tribute to Michael Perry’s work should include critiques of his work (even if they are about an obscure essay Perry wrote forty-five years ago). But Perry never wrote about reparations, which was the focus of Alexander’s essay.

It turns out that Alexander’s piece is self-plagiarism. In 2021, Alexander published an essay on the far-right blog American Thinker titled “The Misguided Call for Reparations.” Substantial sections of that blog post are repeated word for word in the Emory Law Journal submission, but there is no citation for it in the paper. (It’s not clear if Alexander informed the editors that much of his essay had already been published.) This does explain why so much of Alexander’s essay is unrelated to the work of Michael Perry that was the subject of this celebration: Alexander was simply recycling his rantings about race that he’d already published.

Turley writes: “Ideally, this conflict should have been resolved with more work on both sides. I do believe that this essay would have been greatly improved with some rewriting or further explanation of these points. However, editors have an equal responsibility in maintaining a diversity of viewpoints and in recognizing that some ‘editing’ demands can reflect bias or viewpoint discrimination.” That’s a reasonable approach. However, Alexander withdrew the essay, and the Emory Law Journal didn’t. Alexander could have pushed back and refused to make certain changes that he felt were biased demands. Instead, Alexander refused to make any changes at all and refused to do any editing work. 

Heriot and Turley both claim (without evidence) that conservatives and libertarians face massive censorship by law journals. Yet the Emory Law Journal did invite a conservative to contribute an essay, and Heriot reveals that that there was a second conservative who also wrote an essay for the tribute, and there were apparently no conflicts with the editors about it or viewpoint discrimination against that writer. This indicates the problem with Alexander’s essay was not bias against his conservative viewpoint, but the poor writing and failure to write about the assigned subject because he wanted to reprint his blog rantings.

While we should be concerned about ideological discrimination in academia, we need to reject baseless accusations of bias about editing a badly written essay. This is an effort to intimidate student editors of a law journal into abandoning scholarly standards simply because a conservative submitted an article. Anthony Michael Kreis noted, “I do not love law professors singling out law students by name on nationally read blogs for the work they do on our behalf **without compensation**.” Louis Bonham at Minding the Campus made a not-so-subtle call for student editors to have their legal careers cancelled, calling this a “huge black eye for the ELJ, Emory University School of Law, and, quite possibly, the careers of the students involved.” The comments on the Instapundit article included two people posting the editor’s photograph and this bigoted statement: “I can’t imagine why a woman named (((Kerker-Goldstein))) would be trying to subvert our national Christian values and customs on behalf of our racial enemies.”

The attacks on the Emory Law Journal also reflect a deep misunderstanding of what academic freedom means. Robby Soave in Reason mentioned the case of Alexander’s occasional coauthor Amy Wax and wrote, “Alexander is facing an even more obvious violation of basic principles of academic freedom.” While the Wax case is a real threat to academic freedom because it involves a university punishing a professor for their views, the Alexander incident isn’t about academic freedom at all.

Academic freedom is the right not to be punished for your views unless you have violated scholarly standards and receive due process. But the failure of someone to publish you is not a form of punishment. Nobody has a right to be published free from editing.

Editors get to make judgments about articles. The judgments may be good and they may be bad, but they are not violations of academic freedom. The only academic freedom right here is the right of the editors to make editing decisions. Just like a graduate student teaching a class is protected by academic freedom, so too are the student editors of an academic journal.

The attacks on the Emory Law Journal reflect the ideological blinders of our times. So many people are convinced that conservatives are oppressed on campus that they jump to conclusions that confirm their presumptions at the first hint that some “woke” student might be concerned about “hurtful” language. But I think the details about this case show a very different picture from the initial reports, and reveal that the Emory Law Journal editors made reasonable reactions to a deeply flawed submission and were still open to publishing it.

John K. Wilson was a 2019-20 fellow with the University of California National Center for Free Speech and Civic Engagement, and is the author of eight books, including Patriotic Correctness: Academic Freedom and Its Enemies.

17 thoughts on “In Defense of the Emory Law Journal

  1. I have zero sympathy with the article in question and would have no issue had it been rejected from the start (which would have been a good call in this case). But it wasn’t an offer to publish after revisions, it was an offer to publish that was then withdrawn if it wasn’t revised. That would seem to be a very different kettle of stinking fish and very suspect.

    • An invitation to submit is not a guarantee of publication, and certain not an exemption from the normal editing process. It was an offer to publish after revisions (which is exactly the same as withdrawing an offer if it isn’t revised): “We would welcome a manuscript revised along the lines we have suggested….” It’s the same kettle of fish, and nothing is suspect about asking for a bad submission to be revised.

  2. This is a very helpful clarification about a situation I only knew a little about. But I do want to question one generalization near the end: “Editors get to make judgments about articles. The judgments may be good and they may be bad, but they are not violations of academic freedom. The only academic freedom right here is the right of the editors to make editing decisions.”

    Both editors and researchers are entitled to academic freedom and I think it is possible for an editor to violate the academic freedom of a researcher/writer. Researchers have a right to academic freedom in the publication of results and conclusions regardless of viewpoint, but must meet academic standards. Editors have the academic freedom to determine (generally through peer review) whether academic standards have been met, but may not reject a manuscript simply because it presents viewpoints they or others find objectionable.

    It’s worth noting that those decrying censorship argue the journal is guilty of viewpoint discrimination and John K. Wilson argues here (very convincingly, I think) that the journal based its decisions on academic considerations, not viewpoint. Everyone agrees that viewpoint neutrality is critical in distinguishing legitimate academic decisions from censorship. In this case, I think the post makes it clear that the editors acted within the bounds of their academic freedom.

    • I don’t agree that journals are obligated to be viewpoint neutral. Journals can have certain approaches and perspectives, and it’s not censorship to make those choices. Viewpoint neutrality is a legal term about government regulation, not an academic term. Journals can (and sometimes should) discriminate against viewpoints that are wrong, such as Holocaust denial. Unlike grading a student or punishing a professor, the choice to publish an article does not have the same serious consequences. That being said, I think scholarly journals should be criticized if they engage in politically motivated viewpoint discrimination, and I argue that the Emory Law Journal did not do this in this case.

      The academic freedom of researchers is the right to publish somewhere without penalty by authorities, not the right to be published. If no editor invites you to publish (or if no one on campus invites you to speak), your academic freedom is not violated. When editors act inappropriately, it can violate the spirit of free discourse and deserve critique, and it may reflect a worrisome culture of intolerance, but it is not a violation of academic freedom.

      • Viewpoint neutrality is indeed a legal concept, central to First Amendment law, but I think it applies to matters of academic freedom as well, and it always ends up a major focus in discussions of this sort. I can’t think of any case where it would be academically legitimate for an academic journal to reject a manuscript that is relevant to its scope and meets its academic standards simply because the conclusion supported by the data and arguments is deemed offensive, upsetting, or politically unacceptable. I think that would violate the academic freedom of the researcher.

  3. You are apparently not familiar with the norms of the legal academy. When an author is invited to publish a symposium piece, students never reject it. When I was on law review, I saw students take mishmashes of nonsense and turn them into something publishable, because “once we invited someone to publish in our journal, it would be an insult to not publish the piece.” This happened not just once, but several times. Plus there was that professor who submitted a symposium piece where almost every footnote was “Editors, please add source.” And this was at Yale. Professor Alexander’s article was light years ahead of symposium submissions that routinely get published, and the students’ objections about the relationship between the subject matter of the symposium and the article are clearly bogus, no one ever enforces any such thing. This was, in short, ideological pique, pure and simple. So whatever the norms may be in your field, Emory Law Journal violated the norms of law reviews.

    • If “never reject” is the norm for law reviews, then it’s a norm that violates scholarly standards and ought to be changed. Obviously, rejections are very rare: Most professors write good tributes, and “mishmashes of nonsense” can be turned into something publishable as you say. But what happens when a professor submits a mishmash of nonsense and refuses to allow his piece to be edited or citations added? Are law reviews obligated to publish when the author refuses to let them make it publishable? Your argument that the decision by the Emory Law Journal must have been ideological because everyone knows that law reviews have no standards strikes me as a bit too cynical to be plausible. It is possible for law review editors (even at Yale!) to believe in scholarly standards.

      • I’m sure, in the history of law reviews, one can find examples of editors ultimately rejected an invited symposium piece that didn’t meet basic scholarly standards. My point, however, is that law reviews often will publish even such pieces. And unlike such pieces, Prof. Alexander’s article did meet basic scholarly standards–it had a coherent argument, with supporting footnotes, and was on the subject matter he was asked to write about. The law review editors made it clear in their correspondence that they objected to some of his arguments on political grounds. There was no claim, meanwhile, that his footnotes did not support his text, that his arguments were ad hominem or had other logical fallacies, or that they otherwise were so unscholarly as to give them cause to reject them.

  4. The criticism of the “particular sperm and egg” point seems misplaced. This is not an original point, it’s just a restatement of Derek Parfit’s non-identity problem, and it’s a run-of-the mill component of ethics papers addressing policies that address intertemporal injustice. For instance, a version of this argument has vexed climate change philosophers (you can’t harm people who don’t exist, so you can’t cogently say that the failure to combat climate change will “harm” future generations because those generations’ existence is contingent on our decision to do nothing, etc.).

  5. ‘Perhaps the editors should have realized that some conservatives are very sensitive and need safe spaces free from words like “harmful” and “divisive” that might trigger their ideological outrage. But I have a hard time objecting to any of their editing critiques or presuming that political bias is the only possible reason why editors might want to change an essay this badly argued’.

    You’ve taken the reason why the author and his political allies would object to any changes in the draft’s terminology and spun it around on them, but don’t think that your doing so is childish and disingenuous?

    ‘Comparing scholars concerned about racial disparities to Nazis is not merely “hurtful” and “divisive.” It’s also intellectually lazy, idiotic, and morally repugnant’.

    Styling scholarly comparisons of particular American racial disparity theories to Nazi policies as being PER SE ‘intellectually lazy, idiotic, and morally repugnant’ is ITSELF intellectually lazy, idiotic, and morally repugnant.

    Admittedly, it’s nowhere near as incredible as defending the idea that the students running these law reviews (populated by 2L and 3L neophytes, the preponderance of whom have zero scholarly training) know about, let alone ‘believe in’ and adhere to, scholarly norms and possess sufficient competency to assess submissions for quality and fit (eg what makes a submission ‘strongly’ connected to a concept in addition to why it must be so). (Of course, the same can – and should – be said about the lion’s share of American legal academics, in contrast to their fellows in other faculties and departments and their colleagues abroad.) Surely you appreciate that, with the exception of respecting the pedigree of the top five or so reviews, most legal scholars in the rest of the West consider American student-run law reviews to be a complete joke, yeah?

    • So you say legal scholars have no scholarly background, and then use them as proof (without any evidence) that law reviews are regarded as a complete joke (except the five with that important scholarly credential of “pedigree”). I can’t judge the training of these student editors, but it’s not too difficult to agree with the editors when they say that a paper honoring Prof. Michael Perry ought to be clearly related to Perry, it ought to be well-written and then edited, and it ought to have citations for disputed claims.

      • Indeed, legal scholars IN THE REST OF THE WEST basically view the American law reviews as a joke. In most of the civilised world, legal scholars have doctorates and are inculcated through the process of securing those degrees with the norms of scholarship. Would you like a citation in this blog comment for that proposition, or will it suffice for you to infer from certain indicia in my comments where I am NOT from? (It would furthermore be preposterous to presume that, especially regarding the United States, the concept of pedigree is co-terminous with that of scholarly credential.)

        The students here suggested that the submission wasn’t ‘strongly connected’ to Perry’s work, rather than ‘clearly related’. The former standard is a more nuanced scholarly judgment call about the relationship between the above-mentioned racial theories and the notion of reparations vis-a-vis Perry’s old article, one that these students aren’t even remotely competent to make.

        As for the expectations regarding a submission’s being ‘well-written’, that surely isn’t the working norm for the student-run reviews, as it would exclude 98% of American law articles from publication as such. You cannot defend the indefensible, John. It’s time to get rid of these student-run law reviews, for the same sorts of reasons why new hires in top American law faculties must have doctorates. Be(come) professionals.

        • ” for the same sorts of reasons why new hires in top American law faculties must have doctorates.”

          Can I assume you mean non-law doctorates? After all, the creation and widespread adoption of the J.D. as the standard degree awarded by law schools in the States was intended at least in part to entitle law faculty to have a “doctorate” on some sort of par with other faculty.

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