BY MICHAEL ANTHONY LEWIS

It’s been over a year since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel; we’re still witnessing Israel’s response. All this has made the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians front page (or front screen) news. We’re constantly hearing debates about the perennial issues that make up this conflict.

I’m a CUNY faculty member who specializes in public policy and quantitative methods. I’m not a specialist on the Middle East, the Israel-Palestine conflict, or anything like that. However, after October 7 of last year, I started reading more about the conflict and continue to do so. While doing this reading, I came across the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism.

Before getting into some concerns I have about this definition, I should point out the elephant in the room: I’m not Jewish. Some might wonder what business a Black, non-Jew has opining on how antisemitism should be defined. In my defense, although I’m not Jewish, I am a university faculty member. In that position, I value academic freedom and have thoughts about what such freedom requires. Since my concerns about IHRA’s definition are related to academic freedom, I think it’s appropriate for me to address this topic.

Anyone who has paid attention to the Israel-Palestine conflict is aware of the types of highly charged questions it raises:

• Should Israel be considered a settler colonialist state?
• Should Zionism be considered a type of supremacist ideology?
• Is the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement a legitimate way to support the Palestinian cause?

It should be clear that during any airing of these questions in a university setting, someone is likely to criticize Zionism or Israel. This is where IHRA’s definition of antisemitism becomes relevant. Here’s the definition: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” The definition continues,        “Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic. . . . Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.”

A recent piece in New York Jewish Week discusses a report on antisemitism at CUNY. One part of the article tells us, “The report said the CUNY system should recognize, but not necessarily formally adopt, a popular but controversial definition of antisemitism from the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.”

During the spring of this year, the US House of Representatives introduced a bill that, if it became law, would require federal courts to use IHRA’s definition of antisemitism when enforcing civil rights law. These developments are concerning.

One of the hallmarks of academic freedom is allowing space for both faculty members and students to engage in, “intellectual debate without fear of censorship or retaliation” . Look again at the second question I listed above: “Should Zionism be considered a type of supremacist ideology?” Suppose during a class on the Israel-Palestine conflict, someone made the following argument. Zionism is the belief that Israel has the right to exist as a Jewish state. A Jewish state is one that privileges Jews over other groups. No state has a right to grant privileges based on ethnicity. So, Israel doesn’t have the right to exist as a Jewish state. My interest here isn’t in evaluating whether this argument is sound but instead in the following question: If IHRA’s definition of antisemitism were to become law, would the person who made this argument be in legal jeopardy? What would happen if they were at a university that has decided to recognize or formally adopt IHRA’s definition? Would they be accused of “denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor”? If this argument could bring punishment down on the person who made it, couldn’t this threaten the space to engage in, “intellectual debate without fear of censorship or retaliation”?

Liberia is a topic that occasionally comes up in discussions of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Liberia, some argue, is an example of African American settler colonialism analogous to the case of Zionist settler colonialism. Others dispute this argument. I know next to nothing about African American settlement of Liberia, so I don’t know which side is right. But I’d be concerned about a codified definition of anti-African American racism that would threaten the freedom of those at a university engaging in this debate.

As I was writing this piece, I discovered an article on a “pro-Palestinian” student group at Columbia University that has come out in support of Hamas’s attack as justified resistance. This group’s position is, no doubt, deeply disturbing (to put it mildly) to many. However disturbingly, though, these students are raising questions that are discussed in academia, including What is terrorism? and Can terrorism ever be justified?

In his book Terrorism: A Philosophical Investigation, Igor Primoratz addresses these questions. One of Primoratz’s chapters is called “Case Study: Terrorism in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” Having been published in 2013, the book is too old to include any account of Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack or the violence that’s unfolded since then. But Primoratz claims that at different points in this longstanding conflict, both sides have engaged in terrorism. He then discusses several arguments intended to support claims that specific acts of Palestinian or Israeli terrorism were justified.

Similar arguments could take place on campuses today. Suppose that during a classroom discussion, someone argues that Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack was a justified act of terrorism or that some act of violence committed by Israeli settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank was. This would, no doubt, be a difficult conversation. But if it’s appropriate for a philosopher to write a book about the ethics of terrorism, I don’t see why members of a university community should be forbidden from engaging in such arguments, whether about Israel-Palestine or (as does Primoratz) the 9/11 attacks on the United States. If IHRA’s definition of antisemitism became law, could such discussions in relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict occur? If not, that would be a threat to academic freedom.

Obviously, not everyone agrees with what I’ve said here. For example, lawyer David H. Levitt, in a supportive take on IHRA’s definition, tells us that it’s in the mainstream of legal practices. I’ll resist the urge to go into my doubts about several of Levitt’s points.

I was particularly struck by one of them, though, concerning white people’s use of the N-word. To quote Levitt at length:

A White person who uses the “N-word” in any context whatever is deemed a racist–and no explanation of context is allowed. And those who assert that a definition of antisemitism ought not be “weaponized” or used to establish real world consequences (such as Title VI discrimination) do not make the same contention about the real-world suspensions and firings of persons who violate the N-word taboo, even if it is just to criticize the word itself or to teach about its horrible history.

I don’t know how many suspensions and firings there have been at colleges or universities for any use of the N-word by white folks. But suppose there’s a class discussion about uses of the N-word. Imagine a white student who says they don’t think there should be a taboo on white people using it, uttering the actual word. They might continue that the word isn’t only used as a slur and that if white people don’t use it that way, they should be allowed to say it.

If this were to occur, another difficult conversation would ensue. One thing we should not do, though, is legally define racism in such a way that any utterance of the N-word by a white person makes the person a presumptive racist who must legally disprove that presumption—because that too would threaten academic freedom.

Acknowledgement: I’d like to thank the following for their comments on earlier drafts of this post: Vicki Lens, Martha Schwartz Bragin, Michael Zweig, Eri Noguchi, Jessica Godwin, Raymond Godwin, Evan Mandery, and Joel Blau. Of course, I take full responsibility for any errors that remain.

Michael Anthony Lewis is professor in the Silberman School of Social Work at Hunter College and CUNY Graduate Center.